Allah and the Triune God.

Since Vatican II there has been a concerted effort, framed as pastoralism, to give some credence to Islamic worship, but do we worship the same God?

“The last temptation is the greatest treason:

To do the right deed for the wrong reason.”

T.S. Eliot, Murder in the Cathedral:

What I am about to discuss must be understood in context. The context is: I am not a theologian, this could be very wrong, and It is only a speculative opinion piece by a lay person attempting to understand his Catholic faith more. With that out of the way, to the substance.

I will be referencing and criticising aspects of Vatican II, in particular the belief that Muslims worship the same God as Catholics. But first, what type of council Was Vatican II?

Vatican II (1962–1965) was an ecumenical council, meaning it was a gathering of the world’s bishops under the pope, just like Nicaea or Trent. However, Vatican II explicitly chose not to define dogma or issue anathemas. Pope Paul VI stated:

“Given the pastoral nature of the Council, it avoided issuing solemn dogmatic definitions backed by the Church's infallibility.”

— General Audience, Dec 1, 1966

Therefore, Vatican II does not exercise infallibility in the form of dogmatic proclamation. While it does carry authority, but not all statements are equally binding

There are different types of magisterial authority and the Church teaches a hierarchy of truths and assent:

Dogma (de fide) is infallible requiring absolute assent. Definitive doctrine is infallible (ordinary/universal magisterium) requires firm and irrevocable assent. Then there is non-definitive but authoritative teacher that is fallible and demands religious submission of intellect and will. Finally, there is pastoral or prudential statements that require respectful consideration but are not necessarily binding if honest and rigorous intellect is applied.

So where does the statement on Islam fall? The contentious claim mentioned at the outset comes from Lumen Gentium 16 and Nostra Aetate 3, both pastoral documents.

“...together with us they adore the one and merciful God.” — Lumen Gentium 16

This is not presented as a dogmatic definition, nor as doctrinal development or as an irreformable teaching. Therefore, it falls under non-definitive, pastoral teaching which means Catholics owe it religious submission of intellect and will, but not absolute assent. If serious theological problems are reasonably perceived, especially in light of prior doctrine, Catholics may respectfully withhold assent and even critically evaluate it. This is affirmed by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (1990):

“It is possible that in a given case the theologian may have serious difficulties in accepting a non-irreformable magisterial teaching… He must not present his own opinions as if they were non-negotiable conclusions.”

— Instruction on the Ecclesial Vocation of the Theologian

So, is the statement ‘Muslims worship the same God as Catholics”, compatible with prior teaching?

It seems that prior tradition, prima facie, contradicts Vatican II. Tradition repeatedly identifies Islam as a heresy, and denies that those who reject Christ can know or worship God truly (cf. 1 John 2:23)

Prior tradition also affirms that only through Christ can one know the Father. Thus, many theologians and scholars have argued that Vatican II’s language on Islam is ambiguous at best, or, at worst, contradicts the clarity of earlier dogmatic theology and therefore should be read restrictively, i.e., as a charitable acknowledgment of intention, not an affirmation of theological equivalence

A Catholic may hold:

“This statement about Islam is pastoral and non-definitive, and I believe it is ambiguous or even incompatible with prior defined truths about God, Christ, and salvation.”

This would be within the bounds of orthodoxy, so long as one affirms the Magisterium in principle and avoids pride or disobedience as well maintaining the critique firmly grounded in tradition and truth. Many respected theologians have done so (e.g., Michael Davies, Romano Amerio, Fr. John Hardon SJ in part, SSPX theologians).

Vatican II’s statement that “Muslims worship the same God”: Is not dogmatic, is not infallible and does not bind with the full assent of faith and may be respectfully critiqued in light of prior infallible teachings on Christ and the nature of God. Therefore, A Catholic must affirm the Church’s teachings on God, Christ, and salvation—but is not bound to accept the claim that Muslims “worship the same God” if he deems it to conflict with revealed truth.

Vatican II Says in Lumen Gentium 16 (1964):

“But the plan of salvation also includes those who acknowledge the Creator, in the first place amongst whom are the Muslims; these profess to hold the faith of Abraham, and together with us they adore the one and merciful God, who on the last day will judge mankind.”

This is the key text that states Muslims, “together with us, adore the one and merciful God.”

Traditionally, Popes and Church Fathers often denied that Muslims worshipped the same God. Pope Callixtus III (15th century) prayed publicly for the conversion of Muslims, describing Islam as a heresy, St. John of Damascus (8th century) called Islam a "heresy" and said Muhammad's teaching was inspired by a false spirit and the Council of Vienne (1311-1312) condemned certain views sympathetic to Islam and emphasized its doctrinal errors.

Pope Eugene IV, in Cantate Domino (Council of Florence, 1442), declared:

“The Holy Roman Church firmly believes, professes and preaches that none of those existing outside the Catholic Church... can have eternal life, unless before death they are joined with Her...”

—This included Jews, heretics, schismatics, and pagans, which many would have taken to include Muslims.

These older teachings highlight Islam’s rejection of the Trinity and Incarnation as incompatible with worship of the true God.

So, is there a contradiction? At first glance, yes—but the Church offers a nuanced reconciliation rooted in Thomistic distinctions and the idea of imperfect knowledge of God.

The Church attempts to reconciles the two, prior tradition and Vatican II using philosophical and theological distinction:

The Church distinguishes between, 1) Objective theological error (e.g. denying the Trinity) and 2) Subjective religious intention (e.g. desiring to worship the Creator).

Thus, although Muslims do not have a true concept of God as Trinity, the object of their intention is the one Creator God, and so in a limited, analogical sense, they can be said to “worship the same God.” This seems to be the position of the establishment in the Church today.

Drawing on St. Thomas Aquinas (ST II-II q.10 a.1) who acknowledged that Jews and even pagan philosophers can know and worship God imperfectly, said,

“Although their concept of God may be flawed, it may still refer to the true God under the aspect of first cause or Creator.”

Thus, Vatican II builds on this principle—Muslims intend to worship the Creator, and in that sense, their worship is directed toward the one God, though in truth, their understanding is substantially erroneous.

The Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC 841) simply restates Lumen Gentium without deepening the theological justification. stating,

“The Church's relationship with the Muslims: The plan of salvation also includes those who acknowledge the Creator, in the first place amongst whom are the Muslims...”

However, this is a problem that needn’t exist. Some theologians and traditional Catholics argue that Vatican II speaks too ambiguously and overlooks the essential doctrinal errors of Islam. Because of this vagueness it risks a kind of religious indifferentism by using the same language (“adore the one God”) without sufficient qualification. Others argue Vatican II simply changed tone, not doctrine—shifting from a polemical style to a more pastoral and diplomatic engagement with other religions.

Dr. Taylor Marshall makes the following claim,

“The statements in the Catechism and in Vatican Il's Lumen Gentium are 100% correct when read from within the tradition of the Catholic Church. Muslims have a greater share in the praeambulae fidei even though they do not have saving faith in the Holy Trinity or in Jesus as the Son of God. They also profess to hold the faith of Abraham, but their knowledge of the target and their bow are too weak to deliver what Christ promised - to become the children of God. Although we grant a "higher status" to Muslims over polytheist pagans, we must still actively and prayerfully evangelize Muslims so that they can experience the joy of Christ and the great gift of the Eucharist”.

The reconciliation of what seemingly appears to be incongruent hinges on the understanding “worshipping the same God” not in terms of full doctrinal truth, but in terms of intent and limited natural knowledge. It might be properly understood as a qualified affirmation, not an endorsement of Islam’s theology.

Right, but this seems rather evasive. If the essence of God is denied by Muslims, then how can they claim to worship the same god as Christians? After all, I can worship a god with many attributes common to the Christian God but it doesn’t follow that we worship the same god. Imagine if I worshipped a pagan deity that corresponds to attributes like omniscience, omnipotence and universality, but the pagan god commands evil while the Christian God is goodness itself, it then doesn’t follow that I am describing the same god, even with the caveat of an imperfect understanding by the pagans. If imperfection is the accommodating key, then one falls into differentiation only by degree. Do Hindu pantheists worship the same God as Christians? Well, if intention is the criteria, then it can be said they do, albeit imperfectly. Moreover, some of the attributes of Hindu worship are metaphysical does that coherence with Christianity merely make it imperfect or just different? where does imperfection draw the line between objective dissimilarity and limited aspect of truth? At what point does an “imperfect understanding” of X become so distorted that the subject is not actually directed toward X at all, but toward a different object, Y—even if the intent is to worship X?

The Christian God is not merely omniscient and omnipotent, but Triune, incarnate in Christ, and goodness itself (ipsum esse subsistens in Thomistic terms).

St. Thomas Aquinas writes:

“To believe a thing wrongly about God is not to believe in God.”

— ST II-II, q.2, a.2

This is crucial because if your understanding of God is substantially false, then you are not actually believing in or worshiping God, even if you intend to. Aquinas’s rule is as follows: Minor errors (e.g., about secondary attributes) do not sever the relation to the true God but essential errors (e.g., denying Trinity, Incarnation): destroy the formal object of worship. So, once the conception denies God's essence, the referent has changed. You may call it God, but it is no longer Him.

Islam rejects the Trinity, denies the Incarnation, and denies that God can be said to be Love in the Christian sense (since in Islamic theology, God is will, not nature—His mercy is arbitrary, not essential).So, if one denies the essence of God, as revealed in Christ, how can one be said to worship Him—even “imperfectly”?

Take the pagan god Amun-Ra (Egyptian), the fusion of Amun and Ra. This pagan deity was considered the hidden and visible force behind all things. Some hymns describe him as "one who is everywhere" and "knows all things", suggesting a conceptual closeness to omnipresence and omniscience. Still, Egyptian theology didn’t frame these traits in the same absolute terms as later monotheism. It contains aspects of attributes imperfectly, so are we to assume this was the same God as Christians worship, just incomplete?

Classic metaphysics and the logic of identity might prove useful here. There is a real danger of reducing God to shared attributes. Why? Let’s say person A worships a deity that 1)Created the world 2) s all-powerful and all-knowing 3) Judges mankind, but this deity Is A) not Triune, B) Has no Son and C) Is not identical with Love, but Is mutable or capricious and D) Denies the Incarnation

Then it clear, this is not the same God as the Christian God. Similarity in a few abstract attributes does not establish identity. Philosophically, this is like saying: “All men have noses and eyes”, therefore “All men are the same person”. Which is absurd.

So, if we say Muslims and Christians both believe in a creator and judge, that doesn't mean the referent of their worship is ontologically identical. Now, in fairness, Vatican II does not say Muslims know God as He is, but rather “Together with us they adore the one and merciful God”. However, this phrase is ambiguous. Nevertheless, defenders say it means Muslims intend to worship the Creator and since there is only one Creator, their intention, despite error, is oriented toward the true God

Aquinas gives some support:

“Unbelievers can have some true knowledge of God by natural reason, and in that way they can adore Him.” (ST II-II q.81 a.1)

But Aquinas also says:

“Insofar as they hold things contrary to the faith, they do not worship God truly, but fall into idolatry.”

So, he draws a line—adore imperfectly, yes, but not in truth.

But then, where Is the Line Between Imperfect Worship and False Worship? If we include Islam under “same God” because of intent and some attributes, why not Hinduism or Deism? If we exclude them because of false conceptions, why not exclude Islam too? At some point, “imperfect worship” collapses into categorically false worship, especially when the essence of God is denied.

St. Paul could say:

“What pagans sacrifice, they offer to demons and not to God.” (1 Cor 10:20)

Then there is Pope Leo XIII (1893, Immortale Dei) who says,

“The true religion is the one founded by Jesus Christ... all others are either entirely false or, to the extent they differ from Catholic doctrine, erroneous.”

The Council of Florence, 1438-1445 (Cantate Domino) declared,

“Pagans, Jews, heretics, and schismatics cannot be saved unless they are united with the Catholic Church.”

St. Paul (Romans 10:2) states, “They have a zeal for God, but not according to knowledge.”

This implies that intention alone is insufficient to establish true worship. Vatican II’s pastoral tone affirms a kind of analogical worship based on shared intent but the traditional view, grounded in metaphysical theology and Scripture, holds that God is not known truly unless known through Christ.

“No one comes to the Father except through me.” — John 14:6 (Douay-Rheims)

The Church today would maintain that Muslims worship God imperfectly and unknowingly—but this is more of a diplomatic affirmation than a robust metaphysical one.

It may best be understood as:

“They intend to worship God, but the God they describe and deny key truths about is not, in essence, the same as the Triune God we worship.”

Advocates of Vatican II as affirming that Muslims worship the same Creator through their intent, will have to concede, if being consistent, albeit different in degree, that Hindus intend to do the same, yet why is their imperfect pantheon not given the same deference even if it’s more alien, by degree but not in intention?

This highlights the internal inconsistency within Vatican II, or at least its dominant hermeneutics. After all, why is Islam afforded theological deference while Hinduism is not, when both involve sincere intent and imperfect conceptions of the divine?

Vatican II, in Lumen Gentium 16 and Nostra Aetate 3, gives Islam special mention:

“Together with us they adore the one and merciful God…”

But Hinduism is not described in the same way. Nostra Aetate merely says:

“In Hinduism, men contemplate the divine mystery and express it through myths and philosophical inquiry…”

Nowhere is it said Hindus “adore the same God, yet Hindus, like Muslims, often recognize a supreme being (Brahman or Ishvara), they acknowledge a moral law, worship with great devotion and moral seriousness and intend union with ultimate reality or transcendent good. So why the differential treatment?

Defenders of the Vatican II position would say that Islam is monotheistic—though in error—while Hinduism is polytheistic or pantheistic, which is a categorically different departure from revealed truth. However, this raises a problem because many forms of Hinduism are not polytheistic in the way popular imagination assumes. The Bhagavad Gita, Vedanta traditions, and philosophical Hinduism all assert a supreme, single ultimate reality (Brahman) where the gods are often seen as manifestations or aspects of that one reality. In fact, Hindu monotheists (like Ramanuja or Madhva) view personal deities like Vishnu or Shiva as the only true God. So, in some Hindu traditions, the divine essence is singular, albeit described differently. This collapses the simplistic binary: Islam = monotheism, Hinduism = polytheism.

If Vatican II is willing to extend recognition to Islam based on imperfect monotheism, then by that same token, it should extend recognition to philosophical Hindus, Classical Stoics, Zoroastrians and even some animists who recognize a supreme Creator, But, it doesn’t. So, the question becomes: Is it about how far someone is from truth—or is it what kind of truth is denied?

Islam’s denial of the Trinity and Incarnation is not a small mistake. It is, as St. John of Damascus said, a Christological heresy. Islam explicitly rejects the central truths of Christianity and claims divine revelation in opposition to it.

Consequently, if Hindus are “further away,” they may also be less culpable, because they don’t claim to correct Christianity or reject Christ explicitly.

Paradoxically, one could argue that the Muslim who denies the Incarnation knowingly is in more serious error than the Hindu who has never heard of it, yet, Vatican II reverses this logic.

if the standard is “intention + shared attributes,” then many false gods could qualify and only differ as to degree of proximity, which becomes an arbitrary exercise.

The Thomistic criteria for true worship look invariably to Aquinas who is clear when he discusses when worship is true. According to Aquinas worship is true when its object is the true God and the mode is consistent with right reason and revelation. Aquinas would argue that error in either one leads to false worship, the doctor says,

“To the extent they hold things contrary to faith, they do not truly worship God but fall into idolatry.” (ST II-II q.81)

Thus, even sincere worship of a supreme being may still be idolatrous if the essential nature of God is distorted. This would apply equally to Islam where Muslims deny the Trinity, Hindus collapse God into the impersonal Brahman and modern deists or humanists redefine God as “energy” or “consciousness”.

We are left then again then with the question, where does imperfection end and contradiction begin? And the answer is that Vatican II never defines it. Instead, Vatican II adopts a pastoral tone—wanting to affirm goodwill and shared moral ground—without rigorously addressing the metaphysical and theological inconsistencies its statements create.

However, in philosophical terms, this is the fallacy of equivocation where making the claim equivocates on the word “God” as it equates intention with essence, as well as conflates natural knowledge of God with supernatural faith in Him.

Yet, is polytheism not one aspect of the "imperfect" knowledge, oriented towards knowing God in His fullness? If so, a major tension remains,. The dissonance is precisely the theological crux that exposes the internal incoherence of the Vatican II formulation.

If Islam's denial of essential Christian doctrines is dismissed as “imperfect knowledge” yet still “oriented toward” the true God, then why is polytheism (or pantheism) not likewise considered an imperfect grasp of the divine mystery?

Vatican II implies a graded spectrum of imperfect worship articulating the following: Catholics are the fully ordered Church of Christ, Jews are considered to be partially ordered through the Old Testament (which is now completed with the New Testament) but sincere, and considered people of the covenant. Muslims believe in the Creator God but this belief is imperfect but still oriented in worship towards the “same God”. Hindus, Pagan “Myths”, symbols are not oriented (too distorted) and considered “seekers” only.

But this spectrum lacks logical rigor. Polytheists often recognize a supreme god above the others (e.g., Zeus, Brahman, Odin-All father)—this is often a veiled attempt at unity. Pantheists may hold that all is God, but they seek ultimate meaning, moral order, and transcendence. Their myths may represent, in poetic form, truths about divine justice, providence, or mystery. So, if monotheism with heresy (Islam) still counts as orientation toward the true God, why not polytheism as symbolic groping toward the divine? St. Augustine (City of God, Book VIII, Ch. 23) said,

“The philosophers who rightly understood the existence of the one God were, in a way, closer to truth, even if surrounded by error.”

And St. Paul (Acts 17:23) declares,

“What therefore you worship, though unknown to you, I proclaim to you.”

St. Paul says the Athenian pagans, in their ignorance, worshipped the unknown God—and used that to preach Christ. This is much closer to the polytheist groping than to Islamic dogmatic rejection of Christ. So ironically, the pagan may be closer to truth through poetic error than the Muslim through confident heresy.

Polytheism as symbolic imperfection is merely one lesser degree of perfect knowledge yet orientated towards some understanding of the divine. If we are being pastoral and generous, shouldn’t polytheism be understood symbolically—as imperfect representations of the divine attributes?For example: Zeus = power Athena = wisdom Apollo = light/truth Aphrodite = love/beauty That’s not so far removed from Plato’s Good or the divine attributes in classical theism. So why are these not treated as “imperfect orientations” toward God, as Islam is? The answer is political and ecumenical, not theological. Islam is given this special status because it is monotheistic, externally massive in numbers, globally Abrahamic. These are geopolitical categories, not metaphysical ones.

The Thomistic response says that false concepts cannot worship the true God. St. Thomas Aquinas draws a clear metaphysical line:

“To believe falsely about God is not to believe in God at all.”

(ST II-II q.2 a.2)

So, the Muslim who intends to worship the Creator but denies the Trinity does not worship the true God. The Hindu who sees God in multiple forms may be more open to mystery than the Muslim who dogmatically rejects the Son and Holy Spirit. Thus, in Aquinas’ system, both are in error, but the error of conscious denial (Islam) is worse than the error of ignorance (paganism or Hinduism).

Vatican II’s standard seems theologically arbitrary. If polytheism can be viewed as symbolic grasping of the divine, then Islam's formal heresies are not automatically less disqualifying. Therefore, If imperfect knowledge is sufficient, then polytheists, pantheists, and deists must also “worship the same God”—which the Church has never claimed. If essential doctrinal truth is required, then Islam cannot be said to worship the same God—since it explicitly denies His essence. Therefore, the line between orientation and contradiction becomes impossible to maintain without falling into theological relativism or incoherence.

Moreover, given modern access to vast amount of knowledge, Muslims wilfully, as do jews, reject Christ. Some jews even blaspheme Christ in the Talmud. Persistent and informed rejection of Christ—especially after His revelation—is a grave matter. The gravity of rejecting Christ after His revelation is clear in scripture.

“He that believeth not the Son shall not see life: but the wrath of God abideth on him.”

— John 3:36 (Douay-Rheims)

“He who denies the Son, does not have the Father.”

— 1 John 2:23

“If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not be guilty of sin; but now they have no excuse for their sin.”

— John 15:22

This is not talking about invincible ignorance, but culpable refusal—a knowing, wilful rejection of God. The Gospel is widely available, in hundreds of languages., the Church is visible, publicly preaching Christ crucified. Christ is no longer “hidden” to the nations as in ancient times. Therefore, Muslims, Jews, and others living in modern states with access to media, books, online catechesis, and Christians are not in the same category as tribal pagans in the Amazon. The burden of response is higher:

“To whom much is given, much will be required.” — Luke 12:48

Some passages in the Talmud (e.g., Gittin 57a, Sanhedrin 43a) are blasphemous and degrading toward Jesus. Calling him a sorcerer who led Israel astray. Claiming He is boiling in excrement in hell and mocking His death. Such statements are not innocent misunderstandings. They represent wilful contempt, often codified in rabbinic tradition. And yet—modern Catholic theology tends to treat Judaism as a sort of “older brother in the faith,” glossing over this theological hostility. But the early Church did not:

St. Justin Martyr rebuked the Jews for rejecting Christ knowingly. St. John Chrysostom delivered fierce sermons against those who honoured Jewish feasts. St. Paul says “they please not God, and are adversaries to all men.” (1 Thess 2:15–16). The Church distinguishes between different levels of intention; Culpable Unbelief vs. Invincible Ignorance. The distinction is ancient and important. A belief is invincible when there is access to truth and therefore no fault and not sinful. Then there is vincible belief, where truth is accessible but its rejected or ignored and this is considered sinful, and finally there is culpable belief where truth is known and rejected with the will, which considered gravely sinful. The point is that in the modern world, most non-Christians—especially Muslims and Jews—have at least vincible if not culpable ignorance. So, when Vatican II and its commentators extend salvific hope to all without distinction—without considering wilful rejection—they flatten this essential moral distinction. If we believe Christ is the fullness of revelation Faith in Him is necessary for salvation The Church is the Ark of Salvation Then we must also hold:

That deliberate rejection of Christ, when the Gospel is clearly presented, is a damnable act, not a mere mistake. Vatican II’s language avoids the gravity of that rejection. Instead of saying, as Trent or Florence did:

“Outside the Church there is no salvation, and no one can be saved who does not believe in Jesus Christ.”

Vatican II says:

“Those who through no fault of their own do not know the Gospel… may achieve eternal salvation.” (Lumen Gentium 16)

This shift in emphasis can be interpreted as: Pastoral sensitivity, or Theological compromise It depends on one's hermeneutic. The wilful rejection of Christ Cannot Be Minimized

That merely having “monotheistic intent” does not excuse someone who rejects the Son. That modern access to information increases culpability, not diminishes it. That Judaic and Islamic rejection is, in many cases, wilful, prideful, and even blasphemous. So the Church must recover the clarity of the apostolic witness:

“There is no other name under heaven, given to men, whereby we must be saved.” — Acts 4:12

Pastoral sensitivity can be extremely dangerous as it puts the feelings of listeners over the truth, even if the truth is painful to hear. Ff love is at the heart of pastoralism, where is the love in compromising on the truth that could lead to eternal perdition? Why would a mother, knowing that smoking is dangerous, then tell her sensitive son she caught smoking "its ok son, you get some obvious benefit from smoking", all to assuage the sensitivity of the son. However, in the process her lack of candour that could result in severe illness or even death, then this is not the action of a loving mother but a selfish one who worries how she will be perceived rather than performing her duty as a mother, A mother oriented towards the good, at times will be disliked by an errant son because of what she has to say, to bring about the good.

This moral analogy exposes the core paradox of modern pastoral theology. When pastoral sensitivity is used as a veil for ambiguity or compromise, it ceases to be pastoral at all. It becomes, in fact, a dereliction of duty. The same type of dereliction occurs, espoused by people like bishop Robert Barron, who talks about Catholicism being the “privileged way”, but not the exclusive way to God, when asked whether Jews will make it to heaven.

Pastoral Care Without Truth Is Not Love—It’s Cowardice

“If love is at the heart of pastoralism, where is the love in compromising on the truth that could lead to eternal perdition?”

True love is willing the good of the other—and the highest good is eternal salvation. Anything that obscures that good, even with good intentions, is not love but sentimentality at best, negligence at worst. Christ did not say,“ Sensitivity will make you feel safe” but rather “The truth will set you free.” (John 8:32)

A shepherd who refuses to warn the sheep about the wolves—because it might upset them—is not merciful. He is a hireling.

“The hireling seeth the wolf coming, and leaveth the sheep, and fleeth.”

— John 10:12 (Douay-Rheims)

The mother who knows smoking can kill and her son is caught with a cigarette, instead of warning him sternly, she says, “Well, I know it calms your nerves. You probably mean well.” This seems “loving”—but it is passivity masquerading as mercy.

The Church knows that Christ is the only way to salvation. Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, etc., explicitly reject Christ or distort God’s nature. Instead of warning the world, many pastors now say things like: “We all worship the same God.” “We must affirm what is good in other religions. ”God is bigger than any one faith.” This sounds pastoral. But it’s the equivalent of the mother saying:

“It’s okay—you mean well, and that’s enough.”

Yet in doing so, she withholds the one truth that could save her son from destruction.

“Faith cometh by hearing... and how shall they hear without a preacher?” (Romans 10:17)

Christ’s Own Pastoral Style: Truth Before Comfort, Christ was perfectly pastoral, and yet He: Called the Pharisees “whitewashed tombs” (Matt 23:27) Said to Peter: “Get behind me, Satan!” (Matt 16:23) Told the rich young man he lacked one thing—and let him walk away (Mark 10:21–22) Drove out the money changers with a whip (John 2:15) Why? Because truth, not approval, is the foundation of mercy. The Cross itself is the greatest pastoral act—and it involved: Condemnation of sin A call to repentance The refusal to dilute the demands of truth

“If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross daily.” — Luke 9:23

False Pastoralism Is a Form of Spiritual Negligence. Many modern churchmen: Speak softly about heresy Avoid naming error directly Are allergic to terms like “false religion”, “damnation”, or “extra Ecclesiam nulla salus” But in doing so, they imitate not the Good Shepherd, but Eli, who refused to correct his wicked sons and thus brought a curse on Israel (1 Samuel 3). The point echoes the warning of Ezekiel:

“If you do not speak to warn the wicked… he shall die in his iniquity, but I will require his blood at your hand.” — Ezekiel 3:18

This is not just a personal failure—it becomes a systemic betrayal of the Church’s mission. True Pastoral Care Must Include Hard Truths.

A good shepherd will warn of danger and tells the truth even when it wounds sensitive ears. A good shepherd corrects the sheep lovingly—and clearly This is what Our Lady did at Fatima:

“Many souls go to hell because there is no one to pray for them or offer sacrifices.”

This is what St. John the Baptist did when h lost his head for speaking truth to Herod. St. Paul said,

“Have I become your enemy because I tell you the truth?” — Galatians 4:16

This is what every faithful pastor must do—even when it costs him followers, praise, or comfort. A mother who refuses to correct her son is not loving—she is abandoning him to harm out of fear of confrontation and likewise, a Church that softens Christ to flatter other religions is not merciful—but betrays both Christ and the souls it pretends to shepherd.

Although ecumenism has drifted from its inter Christianity call to dialogue, ecumenism- in its broadest sense- if to be valuable at all, it should reiterate that all humans are created Imago dei, that they have inherent value for this reason. However, while the value is not contingent, it does require honest love in the form of directing all humans to the glory of God and to reside with Him in heaven for eternity. No act that even risks that salvation, one masked even as superficial compassion, is loving at all but rather in some distorted sense of mercy that aims inward towards the person claiming to be compassionate, than outward towards the object of that compassion.

To reiterate. This is a non-expert, personal opinion within the acceptable degree of honest criticism of pastoral assertions contained within Vatican II.